Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving Classification in Convolutional Neural Networks by Rama, Prathibha
Rochester Institute of Technology 
RIT Scholar Works 
Theses 
7-2019 
Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving Classification in 
Convolutional Neural Networks 
Prathibha Rama 
psr6237@rit.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Rama, Prathibha, "Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving Classification in Convolutional Neural 
Networks" (2019). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact 
ritscholarworks@rit.edu. 
Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving
Classification in Convolutional Neural Networks
Prathibha Rama
Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving
Classification in Convolutional Neural Networks
Prathibha Rama
July 2019
A Thesis Submitted
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
in
Computer Engineering
Department of Computer Engineering
Exploring the Effectiveness of Privacy Preserving
Classification in Convolutional Neural Networks
Prathibha Rama
Committee Approval:
Dr. Marcin  Lukowiak Advisor Date
Department of Computer Engineering
Dr. Stanis law Radziszowski Date
Department of Computer Science
Dr. Cory Merkel Date
Department of Computer Engineering
i
Acknowledgments
They say it takes a village to raise a child, but what they did not say is that it also
takes a village to defend a Master′s thesis. I am lucky to have so many people in my
life that have been there for me throughout this journey.
Thank you to my fellow researchers, both past and present, from the Applied
Cryptography and Information Security Lab: Michael Foster, Daniel Stafford, Cody
Tinker, Stephanie Soldavani, Andrew Ramsey, Jason Blocklove, and Eric Scheler.
Not only have you been so supportive, you have also kept me company when I needed
it the most. Also a special shout-out to Cody, Kevin and Yash for responding to my
last-minute questions even when I could have answered them myself.
Thank you to everyone at the RIT research cluster for providing me with the
resources necessary to gather results. A month before meeting you, I honestly did
not think I was going to finish in time. Sidney, Jen, and Andrew, I would have no
results without you and for that I am eternally grateful.
Thank you to my committee members for taking the time to sit in on my defense
and, more importantly, for providing me with the necessary guidance to succeed.
Thank you Dr. Merkel for being the Deep Learning expert in a group of cryptog-
raphers; you answered the simplest questions without judgment, making it easy to
ask no matter the task. Thank you Dr. Radziszowski for being the inspiring math-
ematician that you are and for showing me the ropes in Foundations of Cryptog-
raphy/Advanced Cryptography; I am still in awe at the vast amount of knowledge
you have and I look forward to emailing you with my future security queries. To Dr.
Lukowiak, I cannot thank you enough for all that you have done to guide me through-
out this process; you helped me when I needed it the most and always provided a
path to solve the problems I did not think I could solve.
Thank you to my friends who supported me in person or via phone. Neha and
Karn, you did not have to sit through an hour-long presentation about applied cryp-
ii
tography, but you did, and it meant a lot.
Last, but certainly not least, I want to give a special thanks to my family. We
have had an interesting run these past 7 years and while there were times I wanted to
wallow in self-pity, you all found a way to bring me out and cheer me up. Thank you
Apoorva for understanding the stress of graduate school; sometimes I just wanted to
vent and you were a phone call away. Thank you Dad for providing sound and stable
advice; you are a calm voice of reason in an otherwise noisy environment. Finally,
thank you Mom for just being there; you have put up with my unpredictable stress,
you have stood by my side during my darkest moments, and ultimately I am proud
to call you my friend.
iii
Abstract
A front-runner in modern technological advancement, machine learning relies heavily
on the use of personal data. It follows that, when assessing the scope of confiden-
tiality for machine learning models, understanding the potential role of encryption is
critical. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are a subset of artificial feed-forward
neural networks tailored specifically for image recognition and classification. As the
popularity of CNN increases, so too does the need for privacy preserving classifica-
tion. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) refers to a cryptographic system that allows
for computation on encrypted data to obtain an encrypted result such that, when
decrypted, the result is the same value that would have been obtained if the op-
erations were performed on the original unencrypted data. The objective of this
research was to explore the application of HE alongside CNN with the creation of
privacy-preserving CNN layers that have the ability to operate on encrypted images.
This was accomplished through (1) researching the underlying structure of preexisting
privacy-preserving CNN classifiers, (2) creating privacy-preserving convolution, pool-
ing, and fully-connected layers by mapping the computations found within each layer
to a space of homomorphic computations, (3) developing a polynomial-approximated
activation function and creating a privacy-preserving activation layer based on this
approximation, (4) testing and profiling the designed application to asses efficiency,
performance, accuracy, and overall practicality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Problem
The rise of information technology in the everyday human experience brings forth a
new form of currency: privacy of the individual. A search for restaurants near me,
while seemingly cost-free, is only possible when the individual searching discloses their
current location. Personal data is traded daily and it is only upon close inspection
that the potential vulnerability of sharing such information becomes obvious. As a
front-runner in technological advancement, that plays a lead role in many modern
innovations, machine learning relies heavily on the use of personal data. In ma-
chine learning, analytic models are utilized to make informed predictions on provided
datasets. Because input datasets can vary from public images of handwritten digits
to more sensitive information such as personal medical history, the rise in machine
learning naturally leads to an urgency for privacy within specific applications. In
addition, many machine learning models need significant computing power to process
large amounts of data in an efficient manner. A solution to this conundrum is to take
advantage of cloud resources. From a security perspective, a cloud based solution
opens the door for a myriad of vulnerabilities. But what if it were possible to have
the best of both worlds? Is there potential for taking advantage of cloud resources,
while simultaneously maintaining security of the individual? If it is assumed that an
1
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already trained model is hosted on the cloud, can an individual encrypt their data,
send the encrypted data to the cloud, process the encrypted data through the model,
and receive an encrypted result that only the individual can decrypt? This exact
scenario has been proven possible via privacy preserving classification. Understand-
ing the use of encryption within privacy-preserving classification is therefore essential
when assessing the confidentiality and efficiency of a system. The privacy-preserving
classification problem is concerned with the idea of making encrypted predictions
on an encrypted dataset. In machine learning, there are three datasets involved in
the creation and execution of a predictive model: training, validation, and testing.
During the learning phase, a training dataset is utilized to determine the weights
that make up the predictive model. Throughout the learning phase these weights are
updated until either a minimum error threshold has been met or a maximum num-
ber of iterations has been achieved. A validation dataset is used during the learning
phase to fine-tune the architecture and meta-parameters of the model and query the
models performance on unseen data. This fine-tuning helps minimize the potential
for over-fitting. Following the learning phase, a testing dataset is used to confirm the
predictive power of the final model. This portion is called the classification phase.
In the context of privacy-preserving classification, the learning phase works with un-
encrypted datasets while the inference phase works with encrypted datasets. This
scenario assumes a client-server model where the server has already trained the pre-
dictive model, but would now like to modify the model to classify encrypted inputs.
The learning phase follows the same procedure of updating weights and fine-tuning
model architecture using unencrypted training and validation datasets. The differ-
ence in process can be observed during the classification phase, where the testing
dataset is encrypted with a secret key before it is fed through the model that out-
puts an encrypted prediction. This output prediction can then be decrypted by the
secret key used to encrypt the input data in the first place. Proposed solutions to
2
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the privacy-preserving classification problem are based on various approaches that
include Secure Multi Party Computing (MPC), Secure Remote Computation (SRC),
and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). Although each approach theoretically provides a
viable solution, those that take advantage of HE have been successfully implemented
and documented. The focus of this study is to take a closer look at an approach based
on HE and observe the intersection of security and ease of use.
1.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Derived from the Greek words for same form, homomorphism is a structure-preserving
transformation of one algebraic set into another. In the field of cryptography, HE
describes a cryptosystem where the transformation from the plaintext space to the
ciphertext space preserves relationships between elements. This property allows for
meaningful computation on ciphertexts. Such computations generate an encrypted
result that, when decrypted produce the same value that would have resulted from
the plaintext computation.
1.3 This Work
Several solutions to the privacy-preserving classification problem are based on HE
[1] [2] [3] [4]. While these solutions boast accuracy and efficiency, they are largely
unverified and understudied. In fact, with limited documentation and unavailable
source code, finding even a simple case-study proves difficult. This research focuses
on a more in depth exploration of using HE alongside Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN).
In this study, HElib, an open source cryptographic library based on the Brakerski-
Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [5], was integrated with CNN. Although it
is possible to do both encrypted training and encrypted classification, the primary
3
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focus of this study was to explore the feasibility of encrypted classification and the
intricacies involved with HElib.
To work with HE functions, low degree polynomial-approximations of both the
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and Sigmoid activation functions were designed. Train-
ing of the CNN was done with the original activation functions on unencrypted data
and classification was done with the polynomial-approximated activation functions on
data encrypted by HELib. In addition to the activation layers, a privacy-preserving
convolution layer, privacy-preserving pooling layer, and privacy-preserving fully con-
nected layer were created. To verify the correctness of these privacy-preserving layers,
initial tests were done utilizing a simple three-layer network. This was used to pre-
dict the output of a specified logic gate based on an encrypted input vector and an
unencrypted weights file produced during the training phase. This network was then
tested to illustrate that classification on encrypted data is indeed possible and to
highlight some basic metrics regarding smaller privacy-preserving classifiers.
Following initial results, a larger eight-layer network was created to perform en-
crypted classification on the Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology
(MNIST) handwritten digit dataset. This application was profiled and tested for ac-
curacy, efficiency, performance, and overall practicality. The results of this experiment
illustrate the potential role of HE in many modern information systems, specifically
those that utilize CNN.
To analyze the behavior of privacy-preserving classification from a security/cryptographic
perspective, the HE parameters were varied to observe the effects of parameter size
on efficiency and of noise on accuracy. To analyze the behavior of privacy-preserving
classification from a Deep Learning perspective, the effects of varied scaling were
noted, specifically the relationship between the number of fixed bits used to represent
the weights/biases and overall classification accuracy. How many bits are needed for
successful classification? At what point does the classification accuracy deteriorate?
4
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Background
2.1 Privacy Preservation Techniques
A primary focus for this study is the method of privacy preservation used to secure
CNN; not only should the chosen method allow for secure computation, it must also
provide a robust level of security. Three popular privacy preservation techniques that
were explored in the interest of protecting CNN are SRC, MPC, and HE.
2.1.1 Secure Hardware: Intel SGX
The SRC problem is defined by an individual′s ability to execute software on a remote
computer while maintaining a level of security [6]. The SRC problem assumes that
the remote computer is hosted by a non-trustworthy party and therefore emphasizes
the necessity for both data confidentiality and data integrity.
Introduced as a solution to the SRC problem, Intel Software Guard Instructions
(Intel SGX) aims to secure user-level code with the use of enclaves or protected regions
of memory. Equipped with a special set of CPU instructions, a user can upload data
into a secure container where private computations may be executed. Unlike other
secure hardware platforms, which use attestation for a considerable amount of code,
Intel SGX uses attestation to vouch specifically for the enclave and its contents. On
the surface the Intel Intel SGX appears to be the perfect solution to the SRC problem,
5
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but recent studies have shown that this platform has certain drawbacks. In fact, it
has been demonstrated that the Intel Intel SGX is particularly vulnerable against
cache timing attacks [7]. In addition, according to sources the Intel SGX security
claims do not hold for cloud environments [6] [7]. For example, there is a potential
scenario where there is co-location between a logical processor running Intel SGX and
a logical processor running malicious code. Because the motivation for this study is
to increase security in the cloud, secure hardware was ruled out [6].
2.1.2 Secure Multi-party Computing
MPC refers to a protocol that grants the ability to calculate functions in a distributed
manner. The idea behind MPC is to create a method that allows for several parties
to perform computations with one another while maintaining the privacy of each
party’s input data i.e. collaborative computation without disclosing private data
[8]. With MPC, participating parties each provide their input data. This is divided
into distinct pieces, each of which are masked with a random value and sent out to
various servers. This process ensures the privacy of each individuals personal input
data, while allowing for joint computation [9].
2.1.3 Homomorphic Encryption
A form of encryption that allows computation on ciphertexts, HE has many potential
applications. In a broad sense, HE cryptosystems function like many other Public
Key Encryption (PKE) cryptosystems, where data is encrypted with a public key
and decrypted with a private key. Unlike other cryptosystems, once the data is
encrypted with the public key, HE allows for valid arithmetic operations on encrypted
data. For example if an operation, say homomorphic addition, is performed between
two encrypted values, the output will be the encrypted result of the unencrypted
values added together. Operations done within the ciphertext space therefore mimic
6
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operations done in the plaintext space. This can be observed in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: High Level Diagram of Homomorphic Encryption
Of the three privacy-preserving techniques mentioned, solutions based on Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) have been successfully implemented and documented.
For the purpose of this study, the BGV encryption scheme was chosen as it is the most
effective FHE scheme for polynomial evaluations [10]. An open source implementation
of BGV, HELib was integrated alongside a CNN.
2.2 Types of Homomorphic Cryptosystems
There are three types of HE: Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE), Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE), and FHE.
PHE is a cryptosystem that allows for one type of operation on encrypted data.
This operation can be performed an unlimited number of times within the cipher-
7
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text space. Famous examples of PHE cryptosystems include Rivest Shamir Adleman
(RSA), which allows for unlimited multiplication, El-Gamal, which allows for unlim-
ited multiplication, and Pallier, which allows for unlimited addition [11]. Practical
uses for PHE have manifested in the form of electronic voting, where votes are homo-
morphically added, and Private Information Retrieval, where values are homomor-
phically compared [11].
SWHE is a cryptosystem that allows for a limited number of operations on en-
crypted data. These operations can only be performed a limited number of times
within the ciphertext space. Examples of SWHE include BGN, which allows for un-
limited addition and one multiplication, Polly Cracker, which allows for arbitrary
additions/multiplication, and Sander Young Yung (SYY), which allows for unlimited
ANDs and one OR/NOT [11]. Practical uses for SWHE are generally seen when the
depth of the evaluation operation is constant [11].
FHE is a cryptosystem that allows for an unlimited number of operations on
encrypted data. These operations can be performed an unlimited number of times
within the ciphertext space. Examples of FHE include Gentrys FHE scheme and
BGV, both of which allow for unlimited addition and unlimited multiplication. Be-
cause FHE cryptosystems allow for an unlimited number of operations an unlimited
number of times, they can theoretically be used for any application [11].
2.3 High Level FHE
FHE is a type of HE that allows for an unlimited number of operations on encrypted
data. The first FHE scheme was introduced in 2009 by Craig Gentry [12]. Based
on the mathematics of ideal lattices, Gentrys FHE scheme is comprised of two steps.
The first step is to start with a Somewhat HE scheme (SWHE). SWHE is a type of
HE that allows for both homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication a
fixed number of times on encrypted data. This fixed number of operations is a result
8
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of how SWHE schemes are constructed. Built on the Learning with Errors (LWE)
problem, each ciphertext has some noise that hides the original message. The pri-
mary limitation with this construction is the inevitable noise growth that results from
arithmetic operations; once the noise reaches a certain threshold, the original message
is irretrievable. The second step is to add a Bootstrapping mechanism to the SWHE
scheme to refresh the ciphertext. Bootstrapping essentially consists of homomorphi-
cally evaluating the decryption circuit for noise reduction. Although this method is
both secure as well as functionally correct, it is not considered practical. This lack
of practically is largely because of high computation cost and high memory cost.
Following Gentrys 2009 scheme, several other FHE schemes have been developed.
These include schemes based on ideal lattices (Gentrys scheme)[12], schemes based
on (Ring) LWE (BGV)[5], and schemes based on integers (Van Dijks scheme)[13].
2.3.1 FHE Blueprint
PKE schemes contain the following three functions: KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt.
KeyGen is used to generate both the secret key and the public key, Encrypt is used
to encrypt the plaintext data into a ciphertext, and Decrypt is used to decrypt the
ciphertext data into a plaintext. FHE schemes contain the following four functions:
KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Evaluate. KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt are the
same as any other PKE scheme, but the addition of an Evaluation function allows for
computations on ciphertexts. Evaluation performs some function with a set of cipher-
texts as inputs and outputs a ciphertext that corresponds to a functional plaintext.
For FHE schemes, the evaluate function will consist of Addition and Multiplication.
2.3.2 Noise Growth
The base construction of practical FHE schemes focuses on the concept of noisy
ciphertexts, where each ciphertext has noise that hides the message. This concept
9
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is like hidden error correcting codes, where the intended message is the codeword,
but the sent message is the codeword with some error. If the noise is small, then the
receiver can use the knowledge of a hidden code to remove the noise. However, if the
noise is large, decryption is impossible for the receiver.
When performing any mathematical operation on noisy ciphertexts, noise growth
is inevitable. Thus, both addition and multiplication will increase noise. While
addition adds the noise vectors, multiplication multiplies the noise vectors, making
the noise growth extremely large. Recall that for a cryptosystem to be considered
fully homomorphic, the operations must have the ability to be performed an unlimited
number of times. If noise growth renders the ciphertext meaningless after only a few
multiplications, the cryptosystem is not fully homomorphic. This implies that for
multiplication to be considered meaningful for an unlimited number of times, noise
growth must be managed.
2.4 Convolutional Neural Networks
Neural networks or Artificial feed-forward Neural Networks (ANN) refer to computer
systems that are inspired by the human brain. Comprised of multiple layers, the
nodes found within neural networks are interconnected like neurons found within the
brain. Neural networks constitute three types of layers: input layer, hidden layers,
and output layer. The input layer takes in the various features of an input data point
and relays these features to the hidden layer. The hidden layer then computes a
function over values gained from the previous layer and passes the calculated values
to the next layer. The output layer then performs the final computation on values
gained from the hidden layer [14]. CNN are a type of Neural Network used specifically
for image recognition. Like ANN, CNN consist of an input layer, hidden layer, and
output layer. In addition to the common types of layers observed in ANN, CNN
also have one or more convolutional layers. This new layer is created with spatial
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convolutional filtering in mind and therefore facilitates image processing. At a high-
level CNN take an input image and then, through a series of layers, transforms this
data into an output of label scores. Layers within CNN are ordered one after another,
where each one is linked to a layer before and a layer after. In this case, the output
of a function applied to the neurons of the current layer will be the input neurons to
the next layer [15].
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Related Work
Although privacy preserving deep learning is a relatively new area of research, recent
studies have proven successful with the integration of cryptography and deep learning.
The primary metric for success in most of these studies is the ability to preserve the
accuracy of the original Neural Network even after the introduction of HE.
It should also be noted that there is a distinction between encrypted training and
encrypted classification. Like CNN, designing a privacy preserving CNN involves both
a training phase and a classification phase. In the context of encrypted data, this
means the privacy preserving CNN can be trained on encrypted data and classified on
unencrypted data, trained on unencrypted data and classified on encrypted data, or
trained on encrypted data and classified on encrypted data. The motivation behind
encrypted training is to avoid model leakage; if the model is trained on encrypted data,
it is difficult to infer anything about the data even with heavy statistical analysis.
The motivation behind privacy preserving classification is to ensure individual privacy
while maximizing the efficiency of cloud computing; if a server is hosting an already
trained model can it be modified so that the client can secure their data before sending
it for classification?
Prior to privacy preserving deep learning, efforts were made to integrate HE with
basic machine learning classifiers. In a 2015 study, Bost et. al created three private
classifiers with the Hyperplane, Decision Tree, and Naive Bayes classifiers [16]. Each
12
CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK
private classifier proved both robust and efficient when tested on relevant datasets.
This study provided the necessary groundwork for future attempts at incorporating
HE with Machine Learning.
3.1 Privacy Preserving Deep Computation Model on Cloud
for Big Data Feature Learning
In a study done by Chen et. al [1] privacy preserving deep computation is explored
during the training phase. The goal of this experiment is to improve the efficiency of
training by offloading expensive operations to the cloud. Input data is encrypted using
the BGV encryption scheme and then uploaded to the cloud where the high-order
back propagation can be performed. Because HE does not support exponentiation,
the primary modification introduced is the Taylor series approximation of the Sigmoid
Activation function. Timing and accuracy results were gathered for both the original
high-order back propagation algorithm outlined in the paper and the modified privacy
preserving back propagation algorithm which incorporated the computing power of
the cloud. Results of this experiment clearly show an improvement in efficiency,
with the privacy preserving scheme being two times more efficient, with regards to
timing, than the non privacy preserving scheme. This comparison was done . At
the same time, the privacy preserving scheme introduces a 2% accuracy degradation
when compared to the conventional scheme. Although this experiment does not focus
specifically on privacy preserving CNN, it does examine how to integrate HE with a
deep learning model by using a Taylor Series representation of the Sigmoid activation
function.
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3.2 CryptoNets: Applying Neural Networks to Encrypted
Data with High Throughput and Accuracy
One of the first commercial examples of integrating HE with Neural Networks, Microsoft′s
CryptoNets [2] presents a method for converting learned neural networks to neural
networks that can be applied to encrypted data. The goal of this experiment is to
improve the efficiency of Neural Network classification using the cloud. Input data
is encrypted using the Yet Another Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
(YASHE) encryption scheme and then uploaded to the cloud, where the privacy
preserving neural network classifies the encrypted data. Because HE only supports
addition and multiplication, the primary modification introduced is the replacement
of the non-linear layers. The ReLU activation layer is replaced with the square func-
tion and the Max Pooling layer is replaced with Sum Pooling. Using the modified
privacy-preserving Neural Network, classification accuracy on the MNIST dataset is
98.95%, where as state of the art accuracy is 99.77%. This experiment is tested on a
small CNN that has a total of 9 layers with two activation layers. This study shows
how to implement a small-scale privacy preserving CNN with the modification of
non-linear layers.
3.3 Privacy Preserving Classification on Deep Neural
Network
It is important to note that because the square activation function has an unbounded
derivative, too many of these activation layers will lead to unstable training. This
means CryptoNets becomes largely ineffective for large CNN where there are many ac-
tivation layers or non-linear layers in general. To overcome this drawback, Chabanne
et. al [3] suggests improvements to the CryptoNets solution with the introduction
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of batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy) to both the training and classification
phase. During the training phase, the original ReLU function is used, max pooling is
replaced with sum pooling, and a batch normalization level is added before each acti-
vation layer. During the privacy-preserving classification phase, the ReLU function is
replaced with a low-degree polynomial approximation, max pooling is replaced with
sum pooling, and a batch normalization level is added before each activation layer.
Initial accuracy result show that this approach while successful on a light CNN (9
total layers, 2 activation layers) shows a fair amount of accuracy degradation on a
deep CNN (24 total layers, 6 activation layers). Following initial accuracy analysis,
improvements are made by building new polynomial approximations learned form a
distribution close to output distribution of batch normalization. Results show that
non-private classification accuracy (ReLU) is 99.59% while private classification ac-
curacy is 99.30%. This study highlights how batch normalization and low degree
polynomial approximation of the ReLU activation function can be used to improve
the accuracy of privacy preserving CNN.
3.4 CryptoDL: Deep Neural Networks over Encrypted Data
A study done by Hesamifard et. al [4] takes into consideration the aforementioned pit-
falls and attempts to improve the accuracy of privacy preserving CNN by studying the
behavior of approximated activation functions. The methods for approximating the
ReLU function include: numerical analysis, Taylor series, standard Chebyshev poly-
nomials, modified Chebyshev polynomials, and their approach based on the derivative
of the ReLU function. Using the best method of approximation, ReLU derivative, a
privacy preserving CNN was implemented and tested on both the MNIST and Cana-
dian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR10) datasets. The model achieved a
classification accuracy of 99.52% for the MNIST dataset. Because the approximation
based on the derivative of the ReLU function yielded the greatest accuracy, this is
15
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the approximation utilized for this study.
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Mathematics of Homomorphic Encryption
The foundation of all FHE schemes relies on the mathematics of lattices. Because the
mathematics of lattices contain various hard problems, it lends itself to the field of
cryptography. Two popular hard problems include the Short Integer Solution (SIS),
used to create One Way Function (OWF) and collision resistant hashing, and LWE,
used to create Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) and PKE [17]. Based on
these hardness assumptions as well as others, existing FHE schemes can be divided
into four categories: Ideal Lattice-Based, Integer-Based, (Ring) LWE, and NTRU-
Based. Currently, Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE)-Based cryptosystems are the
primary focus of FHE.
4.1 Mathematic Structures
4.1.1 Lattices
An abstract structure in mathematics, an n-dimensional lattice is all integer linear
combinations of n basis vectors b1, b2, ..., bn. Depending on the basis, the same lattice
can be generated in multiple different ways. An n-dimensional lattice can be observed
in figure 4.1.
Generally speaking, short vectors are considered good basis while long vectors are
considered bad basis [17]. An example of a good basis versus a bad basis for the same
17
CHAPTER 4. MATHEMATICS OF HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Figure 4.1: n-dimensional Lattice [17]
lattice can be observed in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Good basis vs Bad basis for the same Lattice [17]
In simple terms lattices are partially ordered sets where each pair of elements has
a unique combination comprised of an upper bound and a lower bound. A popular
example of a lattice is the natural numbers where the lower bound between two
elements is the greatest common divisor and the upper bound between two numbers
is the least common multiple. The order relation in this example would be divisibility
[18]. This order relation can be observed in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Lattice based on natural numbers with divisibility as the order relation: GCD,
LCM [19]
4.1.2 Rings
A ring R is defined as a set of elements with two operations: addition and multipli-
cation. Therefore, if two elements are added/multiplied within a ring, it will produce
another element in the ring. A ring is an abelian group under addition: addition is
both associative and commutative and there exists and additive identity and additive
inverses. This property of a ring makes subtraction possible. A ring is a monoid un-
der multiplication: multiplication is associate, but not commutative and there usually
exists a multiplicative identity, although it is not required. This property of a ring
makes division impossible. In a ring, multiplication is distributive with respect to
addition [20]. To summarize, a ring is a set of elements that contains addition, sub-
traction, and non-commutative multiplication, but does not contain division. rings
are useful for generalizing structures such as matrices. For example, the 2X2 matrices
with real numbers form a ring as matrix multiplication is not commutative [21].
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4.2 Hard Problems
In cryptography the computation hardness assumption refers to the hypothesis that a
practical size problem cannot be solved in polynomial time, making it impractical for
a computer to solve. The mathematics of lattices contains many such hard problems.
4.2.1 Shortest Vector Problem
The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is one of the most commonly known hardness
problems. This problem states that given a basis, find a shortest non-zero vector,
where λ1 is the length of the shortest non-zero vector. An example of the SVP in 1-
Dimensional space is finding the greatest common denominator between two elements.
On a small scale, this problem seems easy, but as many cryptosystems have shown this
problem can prove difficult to solve. From SVP stems two permutations: Approxmate
Shortest Vector Problem (ASVP) and Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP)
[22].
The ASVP states that given a basis, find α-approximate shortest vector. In other
words, find a non-zero vector of length at most αx1. This permutation suggests that
the goal is not to find the exact shortest vector, but vector that is relatively close to
the shortest [23].
The SIVP states that given a basis, find n vectors of length at most λn, where
λn = min { r: there are n linearly independent lattice vectors of length ≤ r } [23]
4.2.2 Learning With Errors
The hard problem used in PKE is LWE. LWE takes the easy problem of solving a
system of linear equations and transforms it into the hard problem of solving a system
of approximate linear equations [23]:
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Original:
~s ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
5 1 3
6 2 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣11 3 9∣∣∣∣→ Find ~s
Modified:
~s ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
5 1 3
6 2 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣e1 e2 e3∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣11 3 9∣∣∣∣→ Find ~s
where e1, e2, e3 are small values.
The slight perturbation caused by the error vector is what makes this problem
computationally difficult to solve. At a high-level, LWE states that given many noisy
equations on a secret s, it is impossible to find s. Formally, LWE can be defined as:
(A, sTA+ eT )→ Find ~s (4.1)
where AZmxnq , ~sZ
n
q , e is a ”small” error vector.
A variant of the LWE problem, that is as hard as LWE, is the decisional-LWE
problem. At a high-level, decisional-LWE states that given many noisy equations on
a secret s, it is impossible to distinguish them from random values [23]. Formally,
decisional-LWE can be defined as:
(A, sTA+ eT ) = (A, b) (4.2)
where AZmxnq , ~sZ
n
q , e is a ”small” error vector, b is uniformly random.
In cryptography, the hardness of LWE naturally lends itself to both a OWF and
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a PRNG. Given the function:
gA(s, e) = (s
TA+ eT ) (4.3)
If LWE is assumed, then gA is an OWF and if decisional-LWE is assumed, then
gA is a PRNG.
4.2.3 Ring Learning With Errors
Another example of a ring are the polynomials with integer coefficients. In this case,
addition, subtraction and multiplication will successfully produce another polynomial
with integer coefficients, while division will not.
Polynomial Ring K[X] in X over a field K: a0 + a1x+ ...mod aiK
Quotient Ring K[X]/[b0 + b1x+ ...+ bnx
n]: a0 + a1x+ ...mod b0 + b1x+ ...+ bnx
n
RLWE is an extension of LWE that utilizes ring elements:
(A, sTA+ eT )→ Find ~s (4.4)
where eT is a ”small” error vector.
RLWE is used over LWE because it is more efficient to compute and store ring
elements. The following example illustrates addition and multiplication with ring
elements on Zq[x]/x
n + 1:
Say that q = 17 and n = 4 then:
a := 15 + 2x+ 4x2 + 7x3Z17[x]/(x
4 + 1)
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b := 8 + 9x+ 3x2 + 4x3Z17[x]/(x
4 + 1)
Addition:
a+ b = ((15 + 2x+ 4x2 + 7x3) + (8 + 9x+ 3x2 + 4x3)) mod (17, x4 + 1)
= 23 + 11x+ 7x2 + 11x3 mod (17, x4 + 1)
= 6 + 11x+ 7x2 + 11x3 mod (17, x4 + 1)
Observe that the coefficients of the polynomial are bounded by 17 while the poly-
nomial itself is bounded by x4 + 1. This is the reason why 23 becomes 6 in the final
two lines as 23 mod 17 = 6.
Multiplication:
a ∗ b = ((15 + 2x+ 4x2 + 7x3) ∗ (8 + 9x+ 3x2 + 4x3)) mod (17, x4 + 1)
= (120 + 151x+ 95x2 + 158x3 + 83x4 + 37x5 + 28x6) mod (17, x4 + 1)
= (120 + 151x+ 95x2 + 158x3 + 83(−1) + 37(−x) + 28(−x2) mod (17, x4 + 1)
= (37 + 114x+ 67x2 + 158x3) mod (17, x4 + 1)
= (3 + 12x+ 16x2 + 5x3) mod (17, x4 + 1)
Similar to the addition example, the coefficients of the polynomial are bounded by
17 while the polynomial itself is bounded by x4 + 1. Because x4 = −1 mod (x4 + 1),
x4 is replaced with -1, x5 is replaced with -1x, and x6 is replaced with -1x2.
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Fully Homomorphic Encryption
5.1 Practical FHE
Considered the Holy Grail of HE, FHE is a cryptosystem that allows for an unlim-
ited number of operations an unlimited number of times within the ciphertext space.
While theoretically suitable for any application, practically FHE faces certain limita-
tions. To understand these limitations, the underlying structure of well-known FHE
schemes must first be explored.
5.2 FHE Functions
From a high-level perspective, most HE schemes are constructed as follows [24]:
1. Let m be a Plaintext message
2. Let a shared public key be a random odd integer p
3. Choose a random large integer q, small r, |r| ≤ p/2
4. Ciphertext c = pq + 2r +m (Ciphertext c is close to multiple of p)
5. Perform homomorphic addition/multiplication as required
6. Decrypt m = (c mod p) mod 2
FHE schemes contain the following four functions: KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt,
and Evaluate. KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt are the same as any other PKE scheme,
but the addition of an Evaluation function allows for computations on ciphertexts.
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Evaluation performs some function with a set of ciphertexts as inputs and outputs a
ciphertext that corresponds to a functional plaintext. In PHE schemes the evaluation
function allows for either homomorphic addition or homomorphic multiplication, in
FHE schemes, the evaluation function allows for both homomorphic addition and
homomorphic multiplication.
Using the same high-level example, the corresponding homomorphic addition and
homomorphic multiplication operations can be seen below [24]:
5.2.1 Homomorphic Addition
c1 = q1 ∗ p+ 2 ∗ r1 +m1
c2 = q2 ∗ p+ 2 ∗ r2 +m2
c1 + c2 = (q1 + q2) ∗ p+ 2 ∗ (r1 + r2) + (m1 +m2)
5.2.2 Homomorphic Multiplication
c1 = q1 ∗ p+ 2 ∗ r1 +m1
c2 = q2 ∗ p+ 2 ∗ r2 +m2
c1 ∗ c2 = ((c1 ∗ q2) + q1 ∗ c2 ∗ q1 ∗ q2) ∗ p+ 2(2 ∗ r1 ∗ r2 + r1 ∗m2 +m1 ∗ r2) +m1 ∗m2
5.3 Popular FHE Cryptosystems
Two popular FHE cryptosystems are Fan and Vercauteren (FV), and BGV. Both FV
and BGV are built on the RLWE hardness assumption. As a result the plaintext
and ciphertext spaces are defined with regard to some ring R. In this case, the ring
is defined as the polynomials with integer coefficients where addition, subtraction
and multiplication successfully produce another polynomial with integer coefficients.
Formally, R is defined as Z[x]/φd(x), where the polynomial degree is less than n =
φ(d). Generally these polynomials can be represented as a vector of coefficients.
Ciphertext coefficients are reduced modulo q and mapped into the range [−q/2, q/2],
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where [.]q represents the modulus operation itself and Rq represents ring elements
with coefficients modulo q. Plaintext coefficients are reduced modulo t, where t < q.
Additional notation seen in these cryptosystems includes lw,q, where w is an integer
used in a radix-w system and lw,q = [logw(q)] + 1 [25].
The following two functions can be seen in one or both of the cryptosystems:
PowersOf: This serves as a mapping function, where ring elements are converted
to a vector of lw,q elements. Each mapped ring element has coefficients scaled by the
radix integer. In this case the radix integer is iteratively exponentiated based on the
value states after PowersOf, i.e Powersof2 [25].
WordDecomp: This serves as a mapping function, where ring elements are con-
verted to a vector of lw,q elements. Each mapped ring element has coefficients that
are the word decomposition of the original coefficients [25].
5.3.1 FV Cryptosystem
The FV cryptosystem is a FHE scheme that allows for both addition and multi-
plication. Like most FHE schemes, FV encryption is based on noisy ciphertexts,
where each ciphertext has noise that hides the message. A modification of Braker-
ski’s scale-invariant FHE scheme, the FV scheme operates under the RLWE hardness
assumption [26]. A generalized version of the FV scheme, detailed in a study done
by Lepoint et al., can be seen in the example below:
5.3.1.1 Parameter Generation
FV.ParamsGen(λ): Given the security parameter λ, fix a positive integer d that
determines R, moduli q and t with 1 < t < q, distributions χkey, χerr on R and an
integer base w > 1. Output d, q, t,, χkey, χerr, w [25].
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5.3.1.2 Key Generation
FV.KeyGen(d, q, t, χkey, χerr, w): Sample s← χkey, a← Rq uniformly at random, and
e← χerr and compute b = [−(as+ e)]q. Sample a← Rlw,qq uniformly at random, e←
χ
lw,q
err , compute ((PowersOfw,q(s
2)− (e+ a ∗ s))q, a)Rlw,q and output (pk, sk, evk) =
((b, a), s, γ) [25].
5.3.1.3 Encrypt
FV.Encrypt((b, a),m): This message space is R/tR. For a message m + tR, sample
u← χkey, e1, e2 ← χerr, and output the the ciphertext c = ([δ[m]t+bu+e1]q, [au+e2]q)
 R2 [25].
5.3.1.4 Decrypt
FV.Decrypt(s, c): Decrypt a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) by m = [[t/q ∗ [c0 + c1 ∗ s]q]]t  R
[25].
5.3.1.5 Add
FV.Add(c1, c2): Given ciphertexts c1 = (c1,0, c1,1) and c2 = (c2,0, c2,1), output cadd =
([c1,0, c2,0]q + [c1,1, c2,1]q) [25].
5.3.1.6 ReLin
FV.ReLin(cmult, evk)): Let (b, a) = evk and let cmult = (c0, c1, c2). Output the ci-
phertext [25]
[c0+ < WordDecompw,q(c2), b >]q, [c1+ < WordDecompw,q(c2), a >]q
5.3.1.7 Mult
FV.Mult(c1, c2, evk)): Output the ciphertext cmult = FV.ReLin(cmult, evk), where
[25]
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cmult = (c0, c1, c2) = ([[t/q∗c1,0∗c2,0]]q, [[t/q∗(c1,0∗c2,1+c1,1∗c2,0)]]q, [[t/q∗c1,1∗c2,1]]q)
5.3.2 BGV Cryptosystem
The BGV cryptosystem is a FHE scheme that allows for both addition and multi-
plication. Like most FHE schemes, BGV encryption is based on noisy ciphertexts,
where each ciphertext has noise that hides the message. A generalized version of the
BGV scheme, detailed in a study done by Lepoint et. al, can be seen in the example
below [25]:
5.3.2.1 Parameter Generation
BGV.ParamsGen(λ, L): Given the security parameter λ, fix a positive integer d that
determines R and a distribution χ on R. For j = L down to 0, generate a decreasing
ladder of moduli qi. Outputd, qi, χ [25].
5.3.2.2 Key Generation
BGV.KeyGend, qi, χ: For j = L down to 0, sample s
′
i ← χ and set s1 = (1, s′i).
Sample a′i ← Rqi and an element ei ← χ and set bi = a′is′i + 2ei. Set ai = (bi,−a′i)T .
Set s′j = sjxsjR
(2/2)
qj . Set bi = ai + Powersof2(si) (Add Powersof2(s1)R
[log2(qi)]
qi to
a’s first column). Set τs′j+1→sj = bi except for when j = L. Set the secret key sk to a
vector of si and the public key pk a vector of ai and a vector of τs′j+1→sj is a public
parameter [25].
5.3.2.3 Encrypt
BGV.Encryptpk,m: To encrypt a message mR2, set m = (m, 0)R
2
2. Sample r ← χ
and e← χ2 output the ciphertext [25]
c = m+ 2 ∗ e+ aTL ∗ rR2qL
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5.3.2.4 Decrypt
BGV.Decryptsk, c: Suppose the ciphertext c is encrypted under sj. To decrypt c,
compute [25]
m = [[< c, sj >]qj ]2
5.3.2.5 Switch Key
BGV.SwitchKeyτs′j+1→sj , c, qj: Output the new ciphertext [25]
c1 = BitDecomp(c)
T ∗ bj
5.3.2.6 Refresh
BGV.Refreshτs′j+1→sj , c, qj: Suppose the ciphertext is encrypted under s
′
j. Do the
following [25]:
1. Switch Keys: Set c1 ← BGV.SwitchKeyτs′j+1→sj , c, qj for modulus qj.
2. Switch Moduli: Set c2 ← BGV.Scalec1, qj, qj−1, 2, a ciphertext under sj−1 for
modulus qj−1.
5.3.2.7 Add
BGV.Addpk, c1, c2: Takes two ciphertexts encrypted under the same key sj [25].
c3 = c1 + c2 cadd = Refresh(c3, τs′j→sj−1 , qj, qj−1)
5.3.2.8 Mult
BGV.Multpk, c1, c2: Takes two ciphertexts encrypted under the same key sj [25].
c3 = L
long
c1,c2
(x ∗ x) cmult = Refresh(c3, τs′j→sj−1 , qj, qj−1)
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5.4 HElib vs. Microsoft SEAL
To date, there are few practical implementations of FHE cryptosystems. A popular
implementation of the FV scheme is the Microsoft SEAL library. SEAL supports
Python and C++ development and can be used for a myriad of applications. A
popular implementation of the BGV scheme is HELib. Like the Microsoft SEAL
library, HElib is also suitable for Python and C++. Both libraries have similar
capabilities, so when selecting which library to utilize the comparison below was
considered [27] [28].
Initial comparison was done on the basic features that each library provides.
These features include asymmetry, serialization/deserializationn, negative computa-
tions, and encryption parameter/ciphertext size [24]. This can be observed in table
5.1.
Table 5.1: Basic Features
Basic Features SEAL HElib
Asymmetric Yes Yes
Serialization and Deserialization of keys and ciphertexts Yes Yes
Negative Computations Support Yes No
Ciphertext size (less than 1MB for 1 input) No No
Can run on less than 2GB RAM No Yes
Microsoft SEAL and HElib provide asymmetry or implement a PKE scheme. Re-
call that PKE cryptosystems have both a public key, that is used to encrypt the
plaintext data, and a private key, that is used to decrypt the ciphertext data. The
public key can be shared with various users while the private key remains a secret
and is held only by the individual authorized to decrypt the ciphertext data. Both
libraries also provide for the Serialization and Deserialization of keys and ciphertext.
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This means the developer does not have to implement an API for local storage and re-
trieval when it comes to input/output for the encryption schemes. The first difference
between Microsoft SEAL and HElib can be observed with Negative computations. In
integer arithmetic, certain operations can result in a negative value. One such opera-
tion is subtraction, where the second operand is greater than the first operand. While
HElib does not have the ability to encode for negative values, Microsoft SEAL pro-
vides an Integer Encoder or Fractional Encoder that supports negative computation.
Both libraries have a ciphertext size of a least 1MB for 1 input. This size is primarily
due to choice of input encryption parameters. These parameters include the plain
modulus, coefficient modulus, polynomial modulus, etc. Size of these parameters not
only affects ciphtertext size, but RAM requirements as well. Although HElib can still
effectively run on less than 2GB of RAM, Microsoft SEAL cannot.
Following the basic feature comparison, the advanced features of both libraries
were considered. These features include noise budget, recryption, cipthertext packing,
relinearization, and multithreading [24]. This can be observed in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Advanced Features
Advanced Features SEAL HElib
Noise affected after each computation Yes Yes
Recryption No Yes
Relinearization Yes Yes
Ciphertext packing Yes Yes
Multithreading Yes Yes
Because Microsoft SEAL and HElib are built upon RLWE cryptosystems, they
are both noise affected after each computation. Recall that LWE, in this case RLWE,
cryptosystems work by hiding the plaintext with noise and that, after a certain thresh-
old, a noise encrypted plaintext will not decrypt to it’s original state. When these
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ciphertexts are operated upon, the noise grows. With addition/subtraction, noise
growth is fairly manageable, but with multiplication, noise growth can become ex-
tremely large. One way to manage such noise growth is recryption. The process of
recryption converts bounded depth homomorphism to unbounded depth homomor-
phism, resetting the ciphertext noise. HElib allows for recryption, while Microsoft
SEAL does not. In addition to recryption, relinearization can be used to manage
noise growth. Relinearization focuses on reducing the size of the output ciphertext of
the multiplication operation. Microsoft SEAL and HElib both provide a method for
relinearlization.
For the purpose of speed-up Microsoft SEAL and HElib have a ciphertext packing
feature. This technique takes advantage of the Chinese Remainder Theorem and
packs multiple plaintext values into a single ciphertext vector. Operations can then
be performed on the entire vector resulting in faster computation. This process
is called Single Instruction Multiple Data or SIMD. For additional speedup, both
libraries have multithreading capabilities. Microsoft SEAL contains many functions
that are thread-safe by default, whereas HElib can be made thread-safe by setting a
few flags.
Table 5.3 illustrates the basic operations that both libraries provide [24].
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Table 5.3: Operations
Operations SEAL HElib
Addition/Subtraction Yes Yes
Multiplication Yes Yes
Comparison No No
Division No No
Boolean Op. No No
Bitwise Op. Yes Yes
Matrix Op. Yes Yes
Exponentiation Yes Yes
Square Yes Yes
Negation Yes Yes
Addition/Subtraction/Multiplication Plain Yes No
Microsoft SEAL and HElib allow for basic addition, subtraction, and multiplica-
tion between ciphertexts. Neither library allows for comparison, division, or boolean
operations between ciphertexts. Both libraries also provide the capability of bitwise
operations, matrix operations, exponentiation, square, and negation of ciphertexts.
The only difference between the two libraries with regards to operations is that Mi-
crosoft SEAL supports addition, subtraction, and multiplication between a ciphertext
and a plaintext.
Looking at the comparison between Microsoft SEAL and HElib, both libraries
provide similar functionality and operations. The primary difference between the
two libraries is that Microsoft SEAL has negative computation support and explic-
itly defined functions for addition/subtraction/multiplication between plaintexts and
ciphertexts while HElib can run on less than 2GB RAM and provides recryption sup-
port. Although HElib does not have negative computation support, it is still possible
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to differentiate between negative and positive values. Take the plaintext modulus,
p, any value less than p/2 is considered positive and any value greater than p/2 is
considered negative. HElib also has two functions, addConstant and multiplyByCon-
stant, that produce the same functionality as basic arithmetic between ciphertexts
and plaintexts. In this case, the plaintext is just treated as a constant vector. Un-
fortunately, while it is possible for HElib to mimic the missing functionality seen in
Microsoft SEAL, it is not possible for Microsoft SEAL to run on less than 2GB of
RAM or replicate recryption. In addition, while there is limited documentation on
both libraries, when it comes to privacy preserving CNN, HElib appears to be the
library of choice. For these reasons, the library chosen for this study is HElib.
34
Chapter 6
HElib Functions, Security and Parameter Selection
6.1 Math Notation
The HELib implementation uses polynomial rings over integers modulo an irreducible,
cyclotomic polynomial. This is represented as R = Zq[x]/φ(x), where φm(x) is the
mth cyclotomic polynomial. In the case of a composite integer q the polynomial ring
is defined as Rq = Z[x]/(φm(x), q) where Aq is the set of integer polynomials of degree
up to φm(x) modulo q.
The plaintext space is binary polynomials R2. The ciphertext and key space are
the vectors defined over polynomial ring R. Also plaintext a is in the coefficient
representation, where a =< a0, a1, ..., aφ(m)−1 > Z/qZφ(m) is a list of the coefficients
in the polynomial a(X) = Σi<φ(m)aiX
i.
Below is a list of parameters that will be used to describe the functions found in
HElib.
λ: security parameter, representing 2λ security against unknown attacks
n: dimension
q: current integer modulus
χ: noise distribution
N : additional integer parameter
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6.2 Functions
The following section describes the basic functions provided by HElib [29].
6.2.1 ContextGen
Context Generation refers to the process of calculation the ciphertext modulus q,
the variance error distribution σ, and the dimension n. In order to successfully
calculate these three variables, context generation requires the plaintext modulus p,
the multiplicative depth L, and the security parameter λ.
6.2.2 Key Generation
Secret Key: To generate the current secret key sk
s′ ← χN (6.1)
sk = s← (1, s′[1], ..., s′[n])Rn+1q (6.2)
Public Key: To generate the current public key pk
A′ ← RNxnq (6.3)
e← χN (6.4)
b← A′s′ + 2e (6.5)
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6.2.3 Encryption
To encrypt a message aR2
a← (a, 0, ..., 0)Rn+1q (6.6)
r ← RN2 (6.7)
c← a+ AT rRn+1q (6.8)
Here, the transpose of the public key AT is multiplied by a sample r and then
added to the message a.
6.2.4 Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext c
a← [[< c, s > mod φm(x)]q]2 (6.9)
Here, the inner product between c and the secret key s over the polynomial ring
Aq is computed, where q is the current modulus. This result is then reduced once
more modulo 2.
6.2.5 Addition and Multiplication
Homomorphic addition is done by simply adding two ciphertext vectors over Rq with
respect to the same secret key and modulus q. Homomorphic multiplication is done
by taking the tensor product of two ciphertext vectors over Rq with respect to the
same secret key and modulus q. This operation changes the current key.
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6.2.6 Modulus Switching
To manage the inevitable noise growth that comes with homomorphic operations
BGV achieves FHE with the use of recursive modulus switching. Modulus switching
allows for the transformation of ciphertext c mod q to ciphertext c′ mod p by scaling
the original ciphertext by a factor of p/q and rounding the result accordingly. This
process reduces the magnitude of the noise [30].
6.2.7 Bootstrapping
An alternative way to manage noise growth, Bootstrapping is used in BGV as an op-
timization to allow for unlimited homomorphic operations. Bootstrapping is defined
as the process of refreshing a ciphertext by homomorphically evaluating the decryp-
tion function. Refreshing is done by encrypting the ciphertext with a second layer
and decrypting the first layer homomorphically. In order to decrypt the ciphertext
homomorphically, the user must encrypt the secret key and use it as an input to the
Evaluation function alongside the ciphertext to be refreshed [31].
6.3 Security
Since HElib is as an implementation of the BGV cryptosystem and the BGV cryp-
tosystem is based on the RLWE, the security of HElib will be based on attacks against
RLWE. Based on current research, the best known attacks against RLWE schemes
are those used against the LWE problem.
Currently, there are three well known attack algorithms against LWE. These at-
tacks are: The Unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) attack, the decoding attack,
and the dual attack. The uSVP attack works by taking several LWE sample vectors
and translating them into a matrix where each row represents a lattice. This matrix
contains information that reveals the secret errors from each vector such that if the
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shortest vector is discovered, the secret can be recovered as well. To find the shortest
vector, the iterative block-wise algorithm for basis reduction also known as BKZ can
be utilized. The decoding attack works to solve the search-LWE problem. This prob-
lem is solved by treating it as the Bounded Distance Decoding problem, where the
BKZ basis reduction is utilized followed by the recursive Nearest Plane algorithm.
The dual attack is used for ’small’ secrets by aiming to solve the decisional problem
and not the secret. This attack utilizes BKZ to find the shortest non-zero vector.
This short vector is then used to distinguish the samples based on the sample size
[32].
6.4 Parameter Selection
Parameter selection within HElib plays an important role when it comes to both the
security and functionality of the overall system. This section details recommended
parameters for both security and functionality.
6.4.1 Parameters for Security
To achieve a minimum level of security, is important to note that certain input pa-
rameters need to be initialized appropriately. One such parameter is the ciphertext
modulus q. In a study done by Chase et al. researchers use the uSVP attack, decod-
ing attack, and dual attack to determine the necessary size of q to achieve a specific
security level for a given dimension n. In this case, q value recommendations were
made for 3 different security levels: 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. In figure 6.1 a
recommended log2 q is given for n = 2
10 to n = 215 for each security level. Estimated
running time for the uSVP attack, decoding attack, and dual attack are given in bits
[32].
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Figure 6.1: Security Parameter Recommendations [32]
6.4.2 Parameters for Functionality
When utilizing HElib, each parameter is associated with a different functionality. Be-
low is a detailed explanation of what each parameter represents [33].
m represents the specific modulus or ciphertext base. This value is the same q value
mentioned in the ’Parameters for Security’ section. As detailed before, this value is
important when it comes to the security of the overall cryptosystem. In HElib, the
FindM function takes k, L, c, p, d, s and outputs an appropriate m. The value for m
can also be manually set.
p represents the plaintext base. This value needs to be a prime number and is used
as the coefficient modulus. In other words, computations are done modulo p.
r represents the lifting value. This value is also part of the native plaintext space
and the default is r = 1. When r = 1 computations are done modulo p. In the case
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r! = 1, computations are done modulo pr.
L represents the number of levels in the modulus chain. Levels are an integral part
of the underlying cryptosystem used by HElib. From a high-level perspective, levels
refer to a non-fixed ciphtertext space and are used to reduce the noise inside cipher-
texts. This noise reduction is done using the modulus switching technique mentioned
earlier. Levels are normally changed after ciphertext multiplication as this is the op-
eration that generates the most noise. This means the level value is largely dependent
on the evaluation function [34].
c represents the number of columns in the key-switching matrix. The number of
columns plays a key role in the relinerazation process. Recall that the purpose of
relinearization is to reduce the overhead in ciphertext multiplication and can be used
to manage noise growth. Ultimately this value is also dependent on the multiplication
depth of the evaluation function. The default value is c = 3 [34].
w represents the Hamming weight of the secret key.
d represents the degree of field extension. The default value is d = 1.
k represents the security parameter. This is the same λ value mentioned in the
’Parameters for Security’ section. The default value is k = 80. Setting k = 128 is
considered equivalent to the security of AES-128.
s represents the minimum number of slots. This value is used for ciphertext pack-
ing and allows for SIMD. Recall packing refers to the process of combining several
messages into one ciphertext. This is generally used to reduces the overall number
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of ciphertexts and to speedup computation time. In HElib there are two types of
packing: pack into coefficients, and pack into subfields (CRT based packing) [34].
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In this study, an approach to integrate HE and CNN was explored. HE was utilized
to perform the necessary classification on an encrypted dataset, such that when the
information is decrypted, the decrypted result matches the would be result of classi-
fication on unencrypted data. To successfully create a privacy preserving CNN, it is
important to study the building blocks of these networks: layers. Prior to creating a
privacy preserving CNN each layer was studied, implemented, and tested in both the
plaintext space and the ciphertext space. The plaintext layers were used as a baseline
comparison to ensure that the encrypted classification was indeed correct.
7.1 CNN Layers
CNN are made up of cascading layers that take an input layer of image data and
transform it into an output layer of label scores. The four common layers used
in CNN include: Fully Connected Layer, Convolutional Layer, Pooling Layer, and
Activation Layer [35].
7.1.1 Fully Connected
Fully Connected layer is the layer where each neuron is connected to all the neurons
in the previous layer. In this layer the total number of weights is equivalent to the
product of the total number of neurons in the previous layer and the total number
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of neurons in the current layer. In the context of CNN, the Fully Connected layer
appears as the final layer which outputs an N dimensional vector where N is the
number of classes the program can choose from [35]. This can be seen in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Fully Connected Layer [36]
7.1.2 Convolution
Convolution layer is the layer that applies a sliding filter to an input image and outputs
the sum of elementwise multiplications between filter weights and neurons from the
previous layer. The purpose of using a filter is to extract certain characteristics
from an image, thus several filters can be used in the same layer to extract different
characteristics. The sliding filter(s) used in this layer are 3 dimensions and contain
a set of weights that are learned during the training phase. The output of applying
the 3-dimensional filter is a 2-dimensional matrix which is then stacked with all other
filter outputs to create a 3-dimensional result. This layer is unique to CNN and is
based on the technique of convolutional filtering found in image processing [35]. This
can be seen in figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Convolution Layer [37]
7.1.3 Activation
Activation layer is the layer that applies a nonlinear activation function to each neuron
of the previous layer. Activation layers allow ANN and CNN to solve more complex
classification problems by introducing a non-linear component. In fact, without the
addition of this layer or the Pooling layer CNN are only able to classify linearly. Two
popular activation functions are the ReLU function and the Sigmoid function. The
ReLU activation applies f(x) = max(0, x) to then input neuron and the Sigmoid acti-
vation function applies f(x) = 1
1+e−x to then input neuron. Generally, the Activation
layer is found after the Fully Connected layer or the Convolutional layer [35]. This
can be seen in figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Sigmoid Activation and ReLU Activation [38]
7.1.4 Pooling
Pooling layer is the layer that applies a function on non-overlapping subsections form
the previous layer to output one neuron. Like the Activation layer, the Pooling layer
is a non-linear layer. In addition to non-linearity, the pooling layer is also used to
reduce the total number of neurons by reducing spatial size. Two of the most common
pooling layers are the Max Pooling layer and the Average Pooling layer. The Max
Pooling layer outputs the maximum value within the subsection and the Average
Pooling layer outputs the average of the values within the subsection. Generally, the
Pooling layer is found after the Activation layer [35]. This can be seen in figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Pool Layer [37]
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7.2 Layer Design
The focus of this study is only on encrypted classification, therefore the layers were
only created with the feed-forward phase in mind. Backpropagation was not included.
HElib only supports additions and multiplications. This means that not only does
HElib work best when computing low-degree polynomials, it cannot compute inverses
or exponents. Thus, the primary challenge was dealing with the non-linear layers,
specifically the activation layer and the max-pooling layer. To combat this challenge,
the same approach as the experiment done by Hesamifard et. al [4] was implemented.
Layers in the plaintext space were designed in C++. These layers take inputs that
are vectors of data type long and outputs vectors of data type long. Layers in the
ciphertext space were designed in C++ utilizing HElib. These layers take inputs that
are vectors of data type Ctxt and outputs vectors of data type Ctxt.
7.2.1 HElib Encoding and Functions
In the creation of each privacy preserving layer, HElib played a major role. Two
major considerations when working with HElib were how to encode the input image
and what functions to utilized in order to achieve the desired results.
7.2.1.1 Encoding
To encode any input values for HElib encryption, the value was simply converted to
the polynomial ZZX form. This was done by utilizing the toZZX function provided
by the NTL library. It is important to note that the toZZX function is unable to
operate on floating point values, but because each input image consisted of pixels
represented by a positive integer within the range of [0-255] this was not an issue.
Thus each pixel was simply encoded with the toZZX function before being encrypted.
In the case that the input value was a floating point number, this number would have
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to be scaled into an integer before utilizing the toZZX function.
7.2.1.2 Functions
To create a successful privacy preserving CNN there were certain high-level functions
from HElib that were utilized. These functions are detailed below:
1. Encrypt: This function takes as input a public key and a value to be encrypted.
This value must first be encoded in the format polynomial ZZX. This function outputs
a ciphertext value. The public key is generated during the initialization phase and is
represented by the FHEPubKey class.
2. Decrypt: This function takes as input a secret key and a value to be decrypted.
This function outputs a plaintext value in the format polynomial ZZX. The secret
key is generated during the initialization phase and is a subclass of FHEPubKey.
3. AddConstant: This function takes as input a plaintext value and a ciphertext
value. This function adds the values together and outputs a ciphertext.
4. MultiplyByConstant: This function takes as input a plaintext value and a ci-
phertext value. This function multiplies the values together and outputs a ciphertext.
5. Ciphertext Addition: Denoted simply by the ’+’ symbol, this function takes
as input two ciphertext values. This function adds the values together and outputs a
ciphertext.
6. Ciphertext Multiplication: Denoted simply by the ’*’ symbol, this function
takes as input two ciphertext values. This function multiplies the values together and
outputs a ciphertext.
7.2.2 Fully Connected Design
The input to this function is a 1-Dimensional weights vector holding type long and a
1-Dimensional input vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input
is unencrypted/encrypted. The output of this function is also a 1-Dimensional vector
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holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input is unencrypted/encrypted.
This layer consists of performing the dot product between the input vector and weight
vector. The bias vector is then added elementwise to the result. In the plaintext fully
connected layer, the input vector, weights vector, bias vector, and output vector are
all unenecrypted. In the ciphertext fully connected layer, the input vector and output
vector are encrypted while the weights vector and bias vector are unencrypted. HElib
provides the ability to perform addition and multiplication between plaintexts and
ciphertexts with the AddConstant function and MultiplyByConstant function.
Algorithm 1 Fully Connected Layer
Input: in, nInput, nOutput, weight, bias, scale
Output: out
inSize⇐ nInput
outSize⇐ nOutput
for i = 0, 1, ...outSize do
for j = 0, 1, ...inSize do
tmp⇐ in[j]
tmp⇐ tmp ∗ weight[j][i]
if j = 0 then
out[i]⇐ tmp
else
out[y][x][k]+ = tmp
out[i]⇐ b[i] ∗ scale
7.2.3 Convolution Design
The input to this function is a 4-Dimensional weights vector holding type long and a
3-Dimensional input vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input
is unencrypted/encrypted. The output to this function is also a 3-Dimensional vector
holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input is unencrypted/encrypted.
This layer consists of performing the dot product between the input vector and weight
vector within the confines of a sliding filter or kernel. The number of kernels applied
to the input vector determines the depth of the output vector. The bias vector is then
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added elementwise to the result. In the plaintext convolution layer, the input vector,
weights vector, bias vector, and output vector are all unenecrypted. In the ciphertext
convolution layer, the input vector and output vector are encrypted while the weights
vector and bias vector are unencrypted. HElib provides the ability to perform addition
and multiplication between plaintexts and ciphertexts with the AddConstant function
and MultiplyByConstant function.
Algorithm 2 Convolution Layer
Input: in, inHeight, inWidth, depth, kernelHeight, kernelWidth, nkernels, weight, bias, scale
Output: out
count⇐ 0
outHeight⇐ inHeight− (kernelHeight− 1)
outWidth⇐ inWidth− (kernelWidth− 1)
for k = 0, 1, ...nkernels do
for y = 0, 1, ...outHeight do
for x = 0, 1, ...outWidth do
for c = 0, 1, ...depth do
for ky = 0, 1, ...kerenelHeight do
for kx = 0, 1, ...kerenelWidth do
tmp⇐ in[y + ky][x+ kx][c]
tmp⇐ tmp ∗ weight[ky][kx][c][k]
if count = 0 then
out[y][x][k]⇐ tmp
count+ +
else
out[y][x][k]+ = tmp
count+ +
if count = (kernelHeight ∗ kernelWidth ∗ depth) then
count = 0
out[y][x][k]⇐ b[k] ∗ scale
7.2.4 Activation Design
HElib provides only linear operations, therefore any non-linear layer had to be modi-
fied. Because the activation layer is by definition non-linear, the functions needed to
be modified accordingly. The input to both activation functions are a 1-Dimensional/3-
Dimensional input vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input
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is unencrypted/encrypted. The output to both activation functions are also a 1-
Dimensional/3-Dimensional vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if
the input is unencrypted/encrypted. In the plaintext activation layer, the input vec-
tor and output vector are unenecrypted. In the ciphertext activation layer, the input
vector and output vector are encrypted.
7.2.4.1 ReLU
For the ReLU activation layer, the approximation approach taken by Hesamifard
et. al [4] was implemented. In this experiment authors decided to take a different
approach and approximate the derivative of the ReLU function. This approach was
taken because of the derivative′s impact on both error calculation and weight updates.
Authors noted that a simulation of the ReLU derivative, the Step function, mimics
the behavior of the Sigmoid function. From this observation, authors calculated the
integral of the polynomial approximation of the Sigmoid function. This integral was
then used to approximate the ReLU function. The polynomial approximation used
is: 0.0012x2 + 0.5x + 52. Results from the study done by Hesamifard et al. indicate
that this function yielded the best approximation of the ReLU when compared to
other methods: numerical analysis, Taylor series, standard Chebyshev, and modified
Chebyshev. The comparison of this approximation and the ReLU function can be
seen in the figure below.
HElib is unable to operate on floating point values. As a result, the coefficients
seen in the polynomial approximation of the ReLU activation function had to be
scaled by a factor of 10000. This allows each coefficient to be treated as an integer
instead of a float. This scaling needs to be taken into account when observing the
final output.
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Figure 7.5: Approximation of ReLU function
7.2.4.2 Sigmoid
For the Sigmoid activation layer, a Taylor series approximation was implemented.
Because HElib only works well with lower degree polynomials, the Taylor series ap-
proximation is limited to a degree 3 polynomial. The polynomial approximation used
is: −0.002x3 + 0.25x+ 0.5.
HElib is unable to operate on floating point values. As a result, the coefficients
seen in the polynomial approximation of the Sigmoid activation function had to be
scaled by a factor of 10000. This allows each coefficient to be treated as an integer
instead of a float. This scaling needs to be taken into account when observing the
final output.
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Algorithm 3 ReLU Layer
Input: in, nInput, nOutput
Output: out
scale = 10000
c0 = 520000
c1 = 5000
c2 = 12
inSize⇐ nInput
for i = 0, 1, ...inSize do
out[i]⇐ in[i] ∗ in[i] ∗ c2 + in[i] ∗ c1 + c0
Algorithm 4 Sigmoid Layer
Input: in, nInput, nOutput
Output: out
scale = 10000
c0 = 5000
c1 = 2500
c2 = −200
inSize⇐ nInput
for i = 0, 1, ...inSize do
out[i]⇐ in[i] ∗ in[i] ∗ in[i] ∗ c2 + in[i] ∗ c1 + c0
7.2.5 Pooling Design
HElib does not provide any comparison operation, therefore the Max Pool layer had
to be modified. In this case the max pool layer was replaced with a sumpool layer.
Instead of outputting the largest value within a sliding window, sum pool just adds
all the values within the sliding window and outputs that value. The input to this
function is a 3-Dimensional input vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending
on if the input is unencrypted/encrypted. The output to this function is also a 3-
Dimensional vector holding either type long or Ctxt depending on if the input is
unencrypted/encrypted. This layer consists of adding the values within the confines
of a sliding window. In the plaintext sum pool layer, the input vector and output
vector are unenecrypted. In the ciphertext sum pool layer, the input vector and
output vector are encrypted. HElib provides the ability to add ciphertexts with one
another, thus this functionality was used in the ciphertext sum pool layer.
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Algorithm 5 SumPool Layer
Input: in, inHeight, inWidth, depth, pooly, poolx
Output: out
count⇐ 0
outHeight⇐ inHeight/pooly
outWidth⇐ inWidth/poolx
for c = 0, 1, ...depth do
for y = 0, 1, ...outHeight do
for x = 0, 1, ...outWidth do
for i = 0, 1, ...pooly do
for j = 0, 1, ...poolx do
tmp⇐ in[y ∗ pooly + i][x ∗ poolx+ j][c]
if count = 0 then
out[y][x][c]⇐ tmp
count+ +
else
out[y][x][c]+ = tmp
count+ +
if count = (pooly ∗ poolx) then
count = 0
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Privacy Preserving Logic Gates
To test the basic functionality of privacy preserving classification, a small neural
network was created to predict the output of logic gates. This neural network works
by taking an input vector and weights file, feeding them through the network, and
predicting the output based on the logic gate specified.
8.1 Logic Gates
Logic gates are the basic building blocks of any digital system. An electronic circuit
that has one or more inputs and only one output, logic gates provide the perfect
system for a basic neural network classifier. For the purpose of this experiment, the
focus will be on two-input logic gates with the exception of the NOT gate, which has
only one input. Figure 8.1 details the truth table for the logics gates to be classified
by the privacy preserving neural network.
Figure 8.1: Logic Gate Truth Tables [39]
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Looking at the various truth tables, the privacy preserving neural network will
work by taking in an input vector consisting of the values in columns B and A and
output a vector consisting of the values in column X.
8.2 Network
The privacy preserving neural network used to predict the output of the logic gate
consists of two layers: Fully Connected layer followed by a Sigmoid Activation layer.
The idea behind using such a small network is to imitate the behavior of a basic
perceptron. Here the input data is converted to an array and the weights data is
converted to an array. A dot product is then performed between these two arrays
and the result is fed through the Sigmoid activation function. A high level diagram
of this network can be seen in the figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Perceptron [40]
8.3 Test Environment
Computations were run on a computer with 4GB RAM, Intel Core i3 processor, 2.4
GHz and Ubuntu 16.04.
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8.4 Results
For the purposes of this small example, there was no training portion done to output
a weights file. Instead, a predetermined weights file was fed through the privacy
preserving classifier just to observe the performance of the encrypted arithmetic.
Table 8.1 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the NOT gate.
Table 8.1: NOT
A actual expected
0 1.0 1
1 0.0 0
Table 8.2 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the AND gate.
Table 8.2: AND
A B actual expected
0 0 0.0 0
0 1 0.0 0
1 0 0.0 0
1 1 1.0 1
Table 8.3 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the OR gate.
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Table 8.3: OR
A B actual expected
0 0 0.0 0
0 1 1.0 1
1 0 1.0 1
1 1 1.0 1
Table 8.4 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the NAND gate.
Table 8.4: NAND
A B actual expected
0 0 1.0 1
0 1 1.0 1
1 0 1.0 1
1 1 0.0 0
Table 8.5 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the NOR gate.
Table 8.5: NOR
A B actual expected
0 0 1.0 1
0 1 0.0 0
1 0 0.0 0
1 1 0.0 0
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Table 8.6 details the output of the encrypted classifier when given the input data
file and input weights file for the NOR gate.
Table 8.6: XOR
A B actual expected
0 0 0.0 0
0 1 1.0 1
1 0 1.0 1
1 1 0.0 0
It can be noted that all gates performed as expected, yielding the correct output
with both the encrypted input as well as the Sigmoid approximation. The exam-
ple was used as a proof-of-concept before proceeding to a larger network for image
classification.
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Privacy Preserving CNN
The primary motivation behind the creation of privacy preserving CNN is to maintain
a level of information anonymity for all parties involved. While privacy preserving
CNN are not needed in everyday scenarios, there are certainly situations that call for
such measures. For example, when dealing with medical data, oftentimes the privacy
of a patients personal information is of extreme importance or the model utilized by
the hospital to predict a certain diagnosis can be proprietary information. In such
a situation, privacy preserving CNN can allow patients to send personal information
and receive a diagnosis, where both the information and the diagnosis are inaccessible
to all parties except for the patient. In addition to this, the hospital can keep their
model private from the patients, while still utilizing their classifier on the encrypted
data.
9.1 Dataset
The privacy preserving CNN was trained and tested using the MNIST data set.
This datasets was specifically chosen because of it’s wide use in the deep learning
community. This allowed for accuracy comparison with existing studies. This dataset
consists of 60,000 images, with 50,000 image for the training portion and 10,000
images for the testing portion. Images in the MNIST database are 28x28 pixel arrays.
Each pixel is a positive integer within the range of [0-255]. An example of images
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from the MNIST dataset can be seen in figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1: MNIST image sample
9.2 Network
The Network that was created to train and classify the MNIST data set can be seen
in figure 9.2.
The following is a description of the Network seen in the figure 9.2.
1. Convolution Layer: Input image is 28x28x1. The convolution has 20 kernels of
size 5x5 and a stride of (1,1). The output of this layer is 24x24x20.
2. Sum Pool Layer: Input is 24x24x20. The stride is (2,2). The output of this
layer is 12x12x20.
3. Convolution Layer: Input is 12x12x20. The convolution has 50 kernels of size
5x5 and a stride of (1,1). The output of this layer is 8x8x50.
4. Sum Pool Layer: Input is 8x8x50. The stride is (2,2). The output of this layer
is 4x4x50.
5. Flatten Layer: Input is 4x4x50. The output of this layer is 800.
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Figure 9.2: Privacy Preserving Convolutional Neural Network
6. Fully Connected Layer: This layer fully connects the incoming 800 nodes to
the outgoing 500 nodes or is equivalently a multiplication by a 800x500 matrix.
7. ReLU Activation Layer: Takes the ReLU of the value at each input node.
8. Fully Connected Layer: This layer fully connects the incoming 500 nodes to
the outgoing 10 nodes or is equivalently a multiplication by a 500x10 matrix.
9.2.1 Training
During the training phase, the original ReLU function was used and max pooling was
replaced with sum pooling. The CNN was trained with the Keras framework with a
Tensorflow backend on the MNIST database. Training was done on batches of size
128 for a total of 10 epochs.
The optimization algorithm used for training was Adam or the Adaptive Moment
Estimation. The reason this was chosen is because Adam has low memory require-
ments and works well with little tuning of hyperparameters. Default parameters
provided by Keras were utilized [41]:
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Learning Rate = 0.001
beta1=0.9
beta2=0.999
epsilon=1e-8
9.2.2 Testing
During the privacy-preserving classification phase, the ReLU function was replaced
with a low-degree polynomial approximation and max pooling was replaced with sum
pooling.
The privacy preserving CNN takes as input a PNG image file representing a hand-
written digit from 0-9 and the weights file computed during the training phase. The
privacy preserving CNN then encrypts the image, classifies the encrypted image, and
decrypts the output of the final layer. This decrypted vector contains 10 values each
associated with a digit from 0-9. Whichever value from 0-9 is associated with the
highest value found in the vector is the classifiers prediction.
HElib is unable to operate on floating point values. As a result, the values within
the weights/bias file had to be scaled appropriately. Scaling was done simply by
multiplying the input value by some large integer value ranging from 1-512. Addi-
tionally, because operating over encrypted data takes a significant amount of time and
memory, images were not classified in batches. Instead each image was individually
processed by the privacy preserving classifier.
9.3 Test Environment
Initial attempts were made to run computations on the same test environment used
for the privacy preserving logic gates. Unfortunately, this environment did not have
enough memory to handle the privacy preserving CNN. As a result, tests were run on
the Rochester Institute of Technology research computing cluster. This environment
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provides 2304 cores and 24 TB RAM. The entire privacy preserving CNN application
utilizes about 300000 MB/300 GB.
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Profiling Results
When assessing the practicality of any cryptosystem, two of the most important fac-
tors to take into consideration are accuracy and timing: does this correctly classify
the image and how long does it take to classify the image? In the interest of explor-
ing the capabilities of HElib, the privacy preserving CNN was tested under various
conditions to observe the effects of different parameters on both accuracy and timing.
For timing, the number of seconds it took to encrypt/decrypt the image and execute
each layer was measured. For accuracy, normally the value is calculated by running
the privacy preserving CNN over the entire test dataset, but because of limited re-
sources a very basic test had to be implemented. Instead of testing all 10,000 images,
a random image was selected from the testing dataset and run through the privacy
preserving CNN. The entire privacy preserving CNN application utilizes about 300000
MB/300 GB.
10.1 Timing
During initial stages of testing, it was observed that the classification of one encrypted
image can take up to three hours. In the interest of exploring where the classification
may be spending most of its time, timing measurements for encryption/decryption
and each layer were noted. The two tables below detail the time it took to read the
image, encrypt the image, calculate the output of each layer, and decrypt the final
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result. All timing values listed below were calculated with the thread capabilities
disabled, scale set to 128, security parameter set to 80 bits, columns set to 3, and
levels set to 11.
Table 10.1 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute.
Table 10.1: Breakdown of Running Time for CNN Model
Layer Time (seconds)
Convolution Layer (20 feature maps) 1176.8500
SumPool Layer 12.4079
Convolution Layer (50 feature maps) 6084.8600
SumPool Layer 2.3229
Flatten Layer 0.4046
Fully Connected Layer 1529.1300
ReLU Layer 23.3203
Fully Connected Layer 27.2122
From the timing results in Table 10.1, it can be seen that the convolution layers
take the longest to calculate followed by the fully connected layers, the ReLU layer
and the sum pool layers.
Recall that the convolution layer consists of taking the dot product between the
previous layer and a 3-dimensional sliding filter(s) of weights. This process therefore
involves a combination of homomorphic multiplication with a constant and homo-
morphic addition with a constant. The first convolution layer takes as input the
encrypted image of dimension 28x28x1 and has 20 feature maps of size 5x5 with a
stride of 1. With this information, the number of dot product operations can be cal-
culated as (20)*(28-(5-1))*(28-(5-1))*(1)*(5)*(5)= 288000. Because this layer takes
1176.85 seconds, it can be inferred that one dot product computation takes roughly
0.00408 seconds. The second convolution layer takes as input the output of the first
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sum pool layer with the dimension 12x12x20 and has 50 feature maps of size 5x5 with
a stride of 1. With this information, the number of dot product operations can be
calculated as (50)*(12-(5-1))*(12-(5-1))*(20)*(5)*(5)= 1600000. Because this layer
takes 6084.86 seconds, it can be inferred that one dot product computation takes
roughly 0.00380 seconds, which is fairly consistent with the first convolution layer. It
should be noted that the convolution layer also includes the addition of a bias vector
following the dot product computation, but this has been omitted from the estimate
as it is fairly negligible.
The fully connected layered also takes the dot product between an input layer and
a 1-dimensional weights vector, but because the convolution layer consists of several
3-dimensional filters, it takes less time to compute. None-the-less, the fully connected
layers take the second longest to compute after the convolution layer. The first fully
connected layer connects 800 input neurons to 500 output neurons resulting in a total
of 400000 dot product operations. Because this layer takes 1529.13 seconds, it can be
inferred that one dot product computation takes roughly 0.00382 seconds. The second
fully connected layer connects 500 input neurons to 10 output neurons resulting in a
total of 5000 dot product operations. Because this layer takes 27.2122 seconds, it can
be inferred that one dot product computation takes roughly 0.00544 seconds. Like
the convolution layer, the fully connected layer also includes the addition of a bias
vector following the dot product computation, but this has been omitted from the
estimate as it is fairly negligible.
The ReLU layer is the most computationally intensive layer as it estimates the
activation function with the following equation 0.0012x2+0.5x+52. This computation
involves both homomorphic multiplication and homomorphic addition. The ReLU
layer takes as input the output of the first fully connected layer with the dimension
of 500 neurons. Because this layer takes 23.3203 seconds, it can be inferred that one
polynomial computation takes roughly 0.4664 seconds.
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The sum pool layer consists of only homomorphic addition operations. The first
sum pool layer takes as input the output of the first convolution layer with the dimen-
sion of 24x24x20 and has a pool size of 2x2 with a stride of 2. With this information,
the number of addition operations can be calculated as (24/2)*(24/2)*(20)*(2)*(2)=
11520. Because this layer takes 12.4079 seconds, it can be inferred that one addition
computation takes roughly 0.001077 seconds. The first sum pool layer takes as input
the output of the second convolution layer with the dimension of 8x8x50 and has a
pool size of 2x2 with a stride of 2. With this information, the number of addition
operations can be calculated as (8/2)*(8/2)*(50)*(2)*(2)= 3200. Because this layer
takes 2.32292 seconds, it can be inferred that one addition computation takes roughly
0.000726 seconds.
Looking at both convolution layers and fully connected layers, it takes about
0.0038-0.0054 seconds to perform one homomorphic dot product operation, where
the multiplication is between a ciphertext and a constant and the addition is between
two ciphertexts. Next, looking at the ReLU layer, it takes about 0.4664 seconds to
compute one polynomial computation. Finally, looking at both sum pool layers, it
takes about 0.0007-0.001 seconds to perform one homomorphic addition operation.
These results are consistent with the idea that homomorphic multiplication is the most
expensive operation as the layer that involves the multiplication between ciphertexts,
ReLU layer, takes the longest per individual computation. Ultimately the convolution
layers take the longest to calculate because of the sheer volume of computations.
Table 10.2 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
and decrypting the image.
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Table 10.2: Breakdown of Running Time for Encryption/Decryption
Operations Time (seconds)
Read Image 0.0006
Encryption 16.7634
Decryption 0.2503
From the timing results in Table 10.2, it can be seen that the time it takes to read
the image is quite small at 0.000595 seconds. Encryption takes 16.7634 seconds, so
to encrypt one pixel it takes about 16.7634/(28*28*1) = 0.2137 seconds. Decryption
takes 0.250251 seconds, so to decrypt one value it takes about 0.250251/(10) = 0.025
seconds.
Based on the initial timing results seen in Table 10.1 and Table 10.2, it is clear that
the bottleneck in computation is from the Convolution Layer and Fully Connected
Layers.
10.2 Scale Variation
HElib is unable to operate on floating point values. As a result, the values within
the weights/bias file had to be scaled appropriately. Scaling was done simply by
multiplying the input value by some large integer value ranging from 1-512 (1-9 bits).
In this section, the scale was varied to observe the speedup in overall computation
time. All timing values were calculated with the thread capabilities disabled, security
parameter set to 80 bits, columns set to 3, and levels set to 11. In addition, for the
sake of consistency, the network was retrained every time the scale value was changed
to accommodate for the parameter change. This means a different weights file was
used for each encrypted classification.
Figure 10.1 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute based on variation
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in scale.
Figure 10.1: Timings for each Layer based on Scale Variation
From the results in Figure 10.1, as the scale grows so too does the amount of time
it takes to evaluate each layer. Looking at the layers that take the longest to compute
(Conv1/Conv2/FC1) from a scale of 1 (1 bit) to a scale of 512 (9 bits), there is a 5.5x
increase in computation time.
Figure 10.2 illustrates the total time to execute the network based on variation in
scale.
From the results in Figure 10.2, it can be seen that while the overall time does
indeed increase as the scale increases, the growth is not linear. Instead it appears to
rapidly grow from 1-8 (0-3 bits) and plateau around 256-512 (8-9 bits). That being
said, the total time it takes with a scale of 1 (1 bit) is roughly 1600 seconds and
the total time it takes with a scale of 512 (9 bits) is roughly 8800 seconds, which
is a difference of 2 hours. This brings into question timing at the cost of accuracy,
specifically how much accuracy one is willing to sacrifice for faster computation.
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Figure 10.2: Total Time based on Scale Variation
Table 10.3 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
decrypting the image, and if the image was correctly classified based on the scale.
Recall that for accuracy, normally the value is calculated by running the privacy
preserving CNN over the entire test dataset, but because of limited resources a very
basic test had to be implemented. Instead of testing all 10,000 images, a random
image was selected from the testing dataset and run through the privacy preserving
CNN.
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Table 10.3: Scale Variation
Scale Correctly Predicted? Read Image(s) Encrypt(s) Decrypt(s)
1 No 0.0006 15.6955 0.01749
2 No 0.0006 16.0526 0.0177
4 No 0.0006 16.0523 0.1160
8 No 0.0006 16.0651 0.2226
16 Yes 0.0006 16.2280 0.2229
32 Yes 0.0006 16.3002 0.2217
64 Yes 0.0006 16.1879 0.0040
128 Yes 0.0006 16.2058 0.2222
256 Yes 0.0006 16.1387 0.2221
512 Yes 0.0006 16.2236 0.2227
From the timing results in Table 10.3, it can be seen that scale variation does
not have much effect on the time it takes to read the image or the time it takes to
encrypt/decrypt the image. On the other hand, scale variation does appear to have
an effect on accuracy. It is important to note that because the entire testing set could
not be processed with the available computation power, the accuracy metric seen
here is in no way indicative of how the network would perform over all of the images.
That being said, for the few random images tested if the scale was set between 1-8
(0-3 bits), the classifier was unfortunately unable to correctly predict the value in the
encrypted image. If the scale was set between 16-512 (4-9 bits), the classifier was is
able to correctly predict the value in the encrypted image. A potential explanation for
this difference in predictive capability could be the loss of precision with the smaller
scale values. Because the scaling was done simply by multiplying the input value with
an integer, if the input floating point from the weights file was a value much smaller
than 1, multiplying it by a scale value of 1-8 may not have been enough. Recall that
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HElib operates only on integer values, thus if the scale did not round to a value larger
than 0, the weight would be considered 0. A weight with the value 0 changes the
forward propagation calculation, leading to a potential misclassification.
Something important to note is when utilizing the non privacy preserving layers,
unencrypted classification yields the same results as encrypted classification. This
is because the non privacy preserving layers were built with the same mathematical
modifications as the privacy preserving layers. Although it was not tested, if the
original non-modified CNN layers were utilized to classify unencrypted images, scaling
may have had a similar effect on the accuracy results. This is because while the images
were tested with the scaled values, they were not trained with the scaled values.
10.3 Security Parameter Variation
HElib has a few parameters that are essential when it comes to the security of the
privacy preserving CNN. One such parameter is k/λ also known as the security pa-
rameter. The default value is k = 80 and is the value that has been used for the
other experiments. In this section, the security parameters were varied to observe the
threshold for calculation and overall security. All timing values were calculated with
the thread capabilities disabled, scale set to 128, columns set to 3, and levels set to
11.
For HElib, setting k = 128 is considered equivalent to the security of AES-128,
setting k = 192 is considered equivalent to the security of AES-192, setting k = 256
is considered equivalent to the security of AES-256. As a result, these are the three
security parameters tested aside from the default k = 80.
Figure 10.3 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute based on variation
in security parameter.
From the results in Figure 10.3, as the security parameter grows so too does the
amount of time it takes to evaluate each layer. Looking at the layers that take the
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Figure 10.3: Timings for each Layer based on Security Variation
longest to compute (Conv1/Conv2/FC1) from a security parameter of 80 bits to a
security parameter of 256 bits, there is a 1.8x increase in computation time.
Figure 10.4 illustrates the total time to execute the network based on variation in
security parameter.
Figure 10.4: Total Time based on Security Parameter Variation
From the results in Figure 10.4, it can be seen that the larger the security param-
eter, the larger the computation time. Based on the graph presented, the relationship
between the security parameter value and the total time for classification appears to
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be linear with a gradual slope. With a security parameter of 80 bits the total time it
takes to classify an encrypted image is 8856.51 seconds, with a security parameter of
128 bits it takes 9977.31 seconds, and with a security parameter of 192 bits it takes
12209.61 seconds. It is important to note that the security parameter of 256 was
unable to completely classify the encrypted image as the noise growth was too large
and there were not enough levels to accommodate the security parameter. The time
difference between using a security parameter of 80 bits vs a security parameter of 192
bits is roughly 40 minutes. This brings into question timing at the cost of security:
are there scenarios where one would be willing to wait longer to ensure a higher level
of security?
Table 10.4 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
decrypting the image, and if the image was correctly classified based on the security
parameter.
Table 10.4: Security Variation Timings Encrypt/Decrypt
Sec Param FindM Read Image(s) Encryption(s) Decryption(s) Correctly Predicted?
128 11987 0.0006 19.9479 0.2279 Yes
192 15179 0.0005 24.5930 0.3600 Yes
256 18281 0.0053 31.0589 N/A No
From the timing results in Table 10.4, it can be seen that, unlike scale variation, se-
curity parameter variation does have an effect on the time it takes to encrypt/decrypt
the image. As the security parameter gets larger, so too does the amount of time it
takes to encrypt the image. This difference in time is only a few seconds and therefore
negligible in the grand scheme of things.
Security parameter variation also appears to have an effect on accuracy. While
scale variation incorrectly classifies the encrypted image because of the bit precision
of the weights, the security parameter of 256 bits incorrectly classifies because there
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were not enough levels provided to support 256 bits of security. To solve this issue,
the network was run again with the security parameter set to 256 bits and the levels
set to 15.
10.4 Level Variation
Another important parameter found in HElib is L or the number of levels in the
modulus chain. Levels are normally changed after ciphertext multiplication as this
is the operation that generates the most noise. This means the level value is largely
dependent on the evaluation function. There is no default value suggested for the
number of levels, so L = 11 is the value that has been used for the other experiments
as it is the minimum value to successfully classify an encrypted image. In this section,
the levels were varied to observe the threshold for calculation and overall timings. All
timing values were calculated with the thread capabilities disabled, security parameter
set to 80 bits, scale set to 128, and columns set to 3.
Figure 10.5 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute based on variation
in number of levels.
Figure 10.5: Timings for each Layer based on Level Variation
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From the results in Figure 10.5, as the number of levels grow so too does the
amount of time it takes to evaluate each layer. Looking at the layers that take the
longest to compute (Conv1/Conv2/FC1) from number of levels set to 1 to number of
levels set to 15, there is a 65x-70x increase in computation time.
Figure 10.6 illustrates the total time to execute the network based on variation in
number of levels.
Figure 10.6: Total Time based on Level Variation
From the results in Figure 10.6, it can be seen that the greater the number of levels,
the greater the computation time. Based on the graph presented, the relationship
between the number of levels and the total time for classification appears to be linear
with an average slope. It is important to note that if the number of levels was less
than 11, the network was unable to completely classify the encrypted image as the
noise growth was too large. The time difference between using 11 levels vs 15 levels
is roughly 80 minutes. In addition, the slope in Figure 10.6 is much steeper than
the slope in Figure 10.4. The for a faster computation time, it makes more sense to
minimize the number of levels as much as possible over the security parameter.
Table 10.5 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
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decrypting the image, and if the image was correctly classified based on the number
of levels.
Table 10.5: Level Variation Timings Encrypt/Decrypt
Levels Read Image(s) Encryption(s) Decryption(s) Correctly Predicted?
1 0.0005 0.7648 N/A No
3 0.0005 2.2317 N/A No
5 0.0005 5.1763 N/A No
7 0.0006 8.1466 N/A No
9 0.0006 12.7384 N/A No
11 0.0005 16.1540 0.2225 Yes
13 0.0006 21.0840 0.2870 Yes
15 0.0006 25.6875 0.2819 Yes
From the timing results in Table 10.5, it can be seen that, unlike scale variation,
level variation does have an effect on the time it takes to encrypt/decrypt the image.
As the number of levels increase, so too does the amount of time it takes to encrypt
the image. This difference in time is only a few seconds and therefore negligible in
the grand scheme of things.
Level variation also has effect on accuracy. There is clearly a minimum number of
levels needed to successfully classify the encrypted image and manage noise growth.
While there is no easy way to compute the necessary number of levels, generally
number of levels corresponds with the number of multiplications in the evaluation
circuit. The network tested in this experiment contains 4 dot products and a degree
two polynomial calculation. Because of this, initial experiments were done with levels
set to 6. When results showed an error message, guess and check was done to find
the minimum number of levels. In this case, the minimum number of levels necessary
for a successful classification is 11.
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10.5 Column Variation
Another important parameter found in HElib is c or the number of columns in the
key-switching matrix. The number of columns plays a key role in the relinerazation
process and can be used to manage noise growth. Like the number of levels, this value
is also dependent on the multiplication depth of the evaluation function. The default
value is c = 3 and is the value that has been used for the other experiments. In this
section, the columns were varied to observe the threshold for calculation and overall
timings. All timing values were calculated with the thread capabilities disabled,
security parameter set to 80 bits, scale set to 128, and levels set to 11.
Figure 10.6 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute based on variation
in number of columns.
Figure 10.7: Timings for each Layer based on Column Variation
From the results in Figure 10.6, unlike the security parameter value and num-
ber of levels, as the number of columns grow the time it takes to evaluate each
layer actually decreases. Looking at the layers that take the longest to compute
(Conv1/Conv2/FC1) from number of columns set to 1 to number of columns set to
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5, there is a 0.5x-0.6x decrease in computation time.
Figure 10.7 illustrates the total time to execute the network based on variation in
number of columns.
Figure 10.8: Total Time based on Column Variation
From the results in Figure 10.7, it can be seen that the greater the number of
columns, the less the computation time. Based on the graph presented, the relation-
ship between the number of columns and the total time for classification appears to
be linear with an average slope. The time difference between using 5 columns vs 1
column is roughly 76 minutes.
Table 10.6 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
decrypting the image, and if the image was correctly classified based on the number
of columns.
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Table 10.6: Column Variation Timings Encrypt/Decrypt
Columns Read Image(s) Encryption(s) Decryption(s) Correctly Predicted?
1 0.0005 23.6943 0.3644 Yes
2 0.0005 18.6674 0.2673 Yes
3 0.0006 16.2449 0.2235 Yes
4 0.0006 15.3336 0.2153 Yes
5 0.0005 14.1503 0.1621 Yes
From the timing results in Table 10.6, it can be seen that column variation does
have an effect on the time it takes to encrypt/decrypt the image. As the number of
columns increase, the amount of time it takes to encrypt the image decreases. This
difference in time is only a few seconds and therefore negligible in the grand scheme
of things. Table 10.6 also shows that, at least in this case, column variation has no
effect on accuracy. In the interest of reducing overall computation time, it makes
sense to maximize the total number of columns.
10.6 Thread Variation
In addition to the basic functionality provided, HElib has an option for multithread-
ing. In order to allow for this capability, HElib had to be rebuilt with NTL THREADS=on.
In addition certain changes needed to be made in the layer design to allow for the
NTL thread macro.
In this section, the thread count was varied to observe the speedup in overall
computation time. All timing values were calculated with the security parameter set
to 80 bits, scale set to 128, and levels set to 11 and columns set to 3.
Table 10.7 illustrates the time it took for each layer to execute based on variation
in number of threads.
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Table 10.7: Thread Variation Timings for each Layer
Threads Conv1 SP1 Conv2 SP2 Flatten FC1 ReLU FC2
1 1176.8500 12.4079 6084.8600 2.3229 0.4046 1529.1300 23.3203 27.2122
4 343.8590 3.6240 1777.1200 0.3925 0.6780 446.5910 6.8110 7.9470
12 130.7450 1.3780 675.7100 0.4162 0.2580 169.8000 2.5890 3.0220
36 61.3830 0.6468 317.2350 0.4032 0.1210 79.7214 1.2160 1.4190
From the results in Figure 10.7, threading clearly helps with computation time. As
the total number of threads increase, the computation time for each layer significantly
decreases. In fact going from 1 thread to 36 threads has a speedup of 20x, more than
any parameter variation provides.
Table 10.8 illustrates the time it took for reading the image, encrypting the image,
decrypting the image, and if the image was correctly classified based on the number
of threads.
Table 10.8: Thread Variation Timings Encrypt/Decrypt
Number of Threads Read Image (s) Encryption (s) Decryption (s)
1 0.000572 16.1563 0.223557
4 0.000645 16.6239 0.249485
12 0.0006 16.2086 0.228941
36 0.000626 16.7332 0.264578
From the results in Figure 10.8, multithreading has no effect on the time it takes
to read the image or encryption/decryption time. Regardless, the significant im-
provement in computation time makes threading extremely valuable in the process of
encrypted classification. In the case that it is possible to enable multithreading, the
scale value, security parameter value, number of levels, and number of columns can be
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set to any value within reason. Of course, with regard to the scale value and number
of levels, the accuracy of the evaluation circuit must be taken into consideration.
10.7 Fast Configuration
Based on the aforementioned results, a final test was done to gather timing for the fast
configuration. Fast configuration refers to a combination of the parameters that had
the best timing, while still maintaining a correct prediction. In this section timing
values were calculated with the security parameter set to 80 bits, scale set to 128,
levels set to 11, columns set to 5, and threads set to 36.
Table 10.9: Fast Configuration Timings for each Layer
Conv1 SP1 Conv2 SP2 Flatten FC1 ReLU FC2
51.128 0.445 249.716 0.085 0.020 62.957 0.746 1.139
Table 10.9 shows that the fast configuration does indeed achieve the best time for
this network, with the timing for each layer reaching an all time low.
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Conclusion and Future Work
One significant limitation to this study was the available computing power, specifically
number of cores and overall memory. Although it was eventually possible to access
greater resources with the help of RIT research computing cluster, time constraints
led to the creation of a privacy preserving CNN that, while successful, was only able to
classify a small number of images from the MNIST dataset. With greater computing
power and more time, not only will it be possible to classify the entire MNIST dataset,
a larger privacy preserving classifier could also be implemented. Additionally, a larger
dataset could be trained and tested. One such dataset is CIFAR10.
While this study did not generate results on overall classification accuracy, various
studies indicate that the drawback of privacy preserving CNN is the loss in accuracy
[1] [2] [3] [4]. Results show that when HE is integrated with Deep Learning, the
classification accuracy is not comparable state-of the art classification accuracy. To
improve classification accuracy, a future study could be done to explore the potential
of a deep learning number system known as Universal Number (UNUM). This could
be integrated with the implementation presented by Hesamifard et. al [4]. Similar to
the floating point format, UNUM was proposed by John Gustafson as a replacement
to the IEEE format. Type III UNUM or Posits perform well with regard to accuracy
in the range near one. This quality makes Posits particularly useful in the realm of
deep learning [42].
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For even greater computation speedup, a future study could take advantage of
other advanced functionalities HElib provides. One such functionally is Ciphertext
packing or Single Instruction Multiple Data. Using this feature take advantage of
a HElib feature that combines several messages into one ciphertext. This process
would reduce the overall number of ciphertexts and speedup the computation time.
Of course this would involve changing the structure of the inputs to each layer as well
as the way each weights file is processed and stored.
Overall, this study proved to be a successful proof of concept with regards to
encrypted image classification. Results showed that it is not only possible to utilize
HElib alongside a CNN to create a privacy preserving classifier, it is possible to
create various types of evaluation circuits as well. Although a significant speedup
was achieved towards the end of experimentation with the help of multithreading, in
some cases multithreading is not possible. If multithreading is not possible, then a
simple change in scale value, security parameter value, number of levels, and number
of columns can have an effect on the overall computation time of the privacy preserving
CNN. Some parameters, such as number of levels and security parameter value, have
a greater effect on timing while others, such as number of levels and scale value,
have a distinct effect on accuracy. It is thus extremely important to note that when
selecting parameters in any HElib evaluation circuit, each value plays a significant
role with regards to computation time and overall accuracy.
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